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ABSTRACT

estimates 1 billion radio frequency integrated circuit (RFIC)
devices will be deployed by 2017 [30], the majority of which
will be IEEE 802.15.4 [4] and ZigBee [40] standards compliant. It is estimated that by 2015, nearly 65 million digital
utility meters, or “smart meters”, will be installed in homes
around the United States [31].

We present a reliable method of PHY-layer fingerprinting
of IEEE 802.15.4-conformant nodes with commodity digital radio chips widely used in building inexpensive IEEE
802.15.4-conformant devices. Typically, PHY-layer fingerprinting requires software-defined radios that cost orders of
magnitude more than the chips they can fingerprint; our
method does not require a software-defined radio and uses
the same inexpensive chips. For mission-critical systems
relying on 802.15.4 devices, defense-in-depth is thus necessary. Device fingerprinting has long been an important
defensive tool; reducing its cost raises its utility for defenders. We investigate new methods of fingerprinting 802.15.4
devices by exploring techniques to differentiate between multiple 802.15.4-conformant radio-hardware manufactures and
firmware distributions, and point out the implications of
these results for WIDS, both with respect to WIDS evasion
techniques and countering such evasion.

These devices will monitor and control many aspects of
our daily lives, from home automation to health care monitoring to industrial management. For mission-critical systems, such as patient insulin pumps and power grid monitors, quick-and-dirty, but accurate identification of network
devices in field environments is very useful—perhaps more
practically useful than the corresponding capabilities of tools
like Nmap [7], Xprobe [12], or P0f [8] in enterprise networks.
The purpose of this work is to expand the state-of-the-art
in physical-layer device identification, specifically for IEEE
802.15.4 and ZigBee devices. We have built a fingerprinting
framework, codenamed Isotope, around commodity hardware and open-source software. We have also developed several techniques that we hope to prove effective, with experimental and statistical significance, in differentiating between
multiple device hardwares and firmwares.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—Wireless communication

Keywords
IEEE 802.15.4; ZigBee; wireless sensor networks; security

1.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 discusses previous work and provides context for our contributions; Section 3 provides a brief primer on the IEEE
802.15.4 standard and introduces the fingerprinting techniques we have developed; Section 4 describes our experimental setup; Section 5 reveals our preliminary results; and,
finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks and a nod toward
future work.

INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSN) represent a massive and
rapidly growing technology sector. Some market research

2.

PREVIOUS WORK

In this section, we briefly describe the types of digital radio
fingerprinting and their application to offensive and defensive exploits. For a more detailed view, Danev, Zanetti, and
Capkun provide a thorough survey of the state-of-the-art
1

in wireless fingerprinting [21]. This work extends previous
work done within our lab [22].

plications, from spectrum analyzers to a jammer for police
and public safety digital radio protocols [19].

Physical-layer device identification, or fingerprinting, endeavors to exploit unique (often subtle) characteristics in the
digital circuitry or firmware implementation of a device.
Slight imperfections in the radio circuitry, introduced during
the manufacturing process, might be detectable during radio transmissions. In addition, bugs or deviations from the
standard in the firmware implementation may also be observable during radio operation. These imperfections, bugs,
or deviations are known as fingerprints or device signatures.

IDPS Design Implications. Our work has significant implications for the design of future intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPS). At the very least, it would inform digital radio monitoring and IDPS with some clues of
what to look for below the level of the logical bytes of captured frames, i.e., what attacks may be facilitated—and so
also detected and disrupted—by crafting not just the frame
payloads but also their physical layer (PHY) and physical
layer convergence protocol (PLCP) representations. Similarly, critical to defense is the knowledge of and ability to
recognize wireless IDPS (WIDPS) evasion, and thus understanding any stable ways that a WIDPS may not see a frame
(beyond just being out of range) but the target would is key.
These types of attacks are introduced in the seminal work by
Ptacek and Newsham [35]. They introduced injection and
evasion attacks in which the data seen over the wire differs
between the receiver and the IDPS. If a packet is ignored
by a receiving radio, then carefully crafted packets can be
injected into the IDPS. On the other hand, packets that
the IDPS may ignore, but that are accepted by a receiving
radio represent the potential for an entire back-channel of
communications that a monitor would never see.

There are both passive [23, 24, 32] and active [18, 13] methods of fingerprinting wireless radio devices. In passive methods, a third party attempts to unobtrusively sniff the communications channel. Unique signals or transmission timing
may be considered a fingerprint. Naturally, this approach is
often lossy or error prone due to the potential lack of traffic
over the wire or interference from the multiple layers of the
radio stack [35]. Alternatively, active techniques attempt to
interact with a device, often by sending specially crafted requests in hopes to elicit a response. Both the data contained
in the response and the response itself can be considered a
fingerprint.

Fingerprint Applications. Fingerprinting digital systems

Ubiquitous deployments of IEEE 802.15.4 devices pose considerable authentication challenges [36], and it is not clear
if classic PKI-based two-way authentication schemes will be
a practical solution. Given the lack of strong cryptographic
authentication during a device’s commissioning phase, to
be able to fingerprint an IEEE 802.15.4 radio on a device
as belonging to a particular vendor’s fleet may provide a
piece of crucial evidence for trusting the device. Even when
cryptographic authentication is in use, the implementation
details of key storage and management may be problematic,
and may lead to the keys being extracted and used by adversaries. In such situations, the capability to fingerprint
physical devices may provide an additional layer of assurance when authentication material comes under suspicion.

has a long history of offensive and defensive applications. Security tool collections such as BackTrack Linux [1] include a
growing number of fingerprinting tools, and security education organizations such as SANS [9] treat it as an essential
topic.
For attackers, fingerprinting targets has long been a way of
focusing effort on finding systems known to be vulnerable.
It is essential in the presence of defensive misdirection measures such as false bannering or redirecting honeypots [11],
as it helps to see through the defenders’ deception. Not
surprisingly, as soon as fingerprinting techniques became a
part of standard TCP/IP network reconnaissance (in toolkits such as Nmap and Xprobe) an arms race ensued with
tools such as Honeyd [3] and IP Personality [5] offering functionality to deceive fingerprinting techniques by imitating
known signatures.

It is worth noting, to the authors’ knowledge, the methods
we describe in this paper and their application to the IEEE
802.15.4 standard represent the state-of-the-art in wireless
fingerprinting without using software-defined radios.

Impersonating trusted wireless nodes has long been a premier tool in attackers’ arsenals. A tool that can identify
software, firmware, or hardware and its version by highlighting differences between implementations, is especially useful when identifying wireless nodes, both benign and malignant, and finding vulnerable software, firmware, and hardware combinations. The IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards offer no exception to this rule. By design, these are
commodity technologies (in particular, much more so at its
origins than 802.11/Wi–Fi). Impersonating a wireless node
does not pose a considerable challenge to attackers, barring strong cryptographic identification of nodes. Fully functional IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee-compatible digital radios
can be acquired cheaply, and are even found in children’s
toys—such as the Girltech IM ME [27, 29], which contains
a full-featured CC1110 [37] digital radio chip often found in
much more expensive equipment. Furthermore, such devices
are not difficult to re-program and re-purpose for various ap-

3.

METHODS

In this section we look at the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and
describe the fingerprinting techniques we have developed.

3.1

IEEE 802.15.4 Standard

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [4]
created the 802.15 workgroup for Wireless Personal Area
Networks (WPAN) in early 2000s to establish standards for
Layers 1 and 2 (physical and link, respectively). The IEEE
802.15 workgroup defined standards that include 802.15.1,
a derivative of Bluetooth intended for general WPANs, and
802.15.4, designed for low-rate WPANs (LR-WPANs). Lowrate WPANs are attractive for low-power, low-range, lowbandwidth, and low-cost applications of wireless networking,
particularly for industrial control and embedded systems.
ZigBee is a Layer 3 (network layer) specification often used
2

on top of the 802.15.4 layers and is more well-known than
802.15.4. While ZigBee is ripe for investigation in many
different forms of fingerprinting, this paper focuses on the
physical layer beneath ZigBee—the 802.15.4 standard.

good neighbor Travis Goodspeed’s packets-in-packets (PIP)
frame-injection technique [28].
The PIP technique for IEEE 802.15.4 digital radios is relatively simple. The 802.15.4 standard requires the SFD to be
0xA7. If an 802.15.4-compliant radio receives an SFD of any
other value, the receiving radio resets itself into a fresh receiving state, listening again for a new SHR. As noted above,
some radios permit us to specify the SFD value via a register, which allows us to transmit frames with non-compliant
SFDs. Any receivers expecting the standard SFD will reset
themselves after seeing the unexpected symbols. The transmitting radio, however, will continue to send the remainder
of the frame. If the remainder of the frame contains a standard SHR the receiver will think it is receiving a fresh packet.
In this way, we are able to transmit a non-standard physical frame that contains a fully-standard physical frame, a
packet in a packet.

Figure 1: IEEE 802.15.4 standard physical frame. For all
physical frames, the SHR should be 8 symbols of zero (0x0)
followed by 0xA7. The frame length, in octets, varies with
the size of the physical payload. Physical frame types differ in their payload requirements. The final element of the
payload, not shown, may be the FCS.
In the IEEE 802.15.4, the smallest amount of information
that can be sent over the air is four bits, also known as a
symbol. The standard defines four types of physical frames:
beacon, data, acknowledgement, and command. The standard physical frame layout, for all four types of frames, is
shown in Figure 1. A standard frame consists of a synchronization header (SHR), a physical layer (PHY) header
(PHR), and a payload within the physical service data unit
(PSDU). The physical frames differ in their payload, but
all contain a standard SHR and PHR. The SHR comprises
an 8-symbol wide preamble of zeros (0x0) and the start of
frame delimiter (SFD), which must be 0xA71 . This header,
as its name implies, serves to synchronize the receiving radio with the transmitting radio so that symbols are correctly
pulled out of the signal. The frame length, a 7-bit number
representing the number of octets in the physical payload,
and a single reserved bit compose the PHR. The payload,
or packet, follows the length, containing all the data for
Layer 2 and higher. Each type of physical frame requires
a different payload structure. Finally, not shown here, the
optional 4-symbol wide frame control sequence (FCS) is a
checksum used to check for data corruption in the payload
during transit.

3.2

Variable Preamble Length
The variable preamble length fingerprinting technique focuses on the preamble used to put the receiving radio into
a state where it is ready to accept an SFD followed by the
remainder of the frame. While the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
defines the preamble length to be eight symbols containing
the value 0x0, some radios might accept frames with fewer
than the stated number while some do not. Figure 2 shows
the general layout of a frame generated to test a target’s
response to non-standard preambles. The aim of this technique is to measure the number of zero symbols before the
SFD a chipset requires in order to accept a frame. Note that
the only portion of the frame that is altered from the IEEE
802.15.4 standard is the preamble length.

Figure 2: Physical frame with variable preamble length. The
number of zero (0x0) symbols that compose the preamble is
varied between 0 and 8. Any response to a non-standard
preamble might signify a fingerprint.

Fingerprinting Techniques

Here we will describe four new techniques for fingerprinting
IEEE 802.15.4 stacks, with a focus on the physical layer.
Each technique is active —a stimulus frame with a nonstandard physical-layer header is transmitted and the target’s response or lack thereof is recorded. Our hypothesis
is that we can distinguish different radio chipsets by which
type of stimulus packets they are able to receive. To determine whether a given chipset has indeed received a packet,
we send a frame whose payload triggers a response by a
higher layer —such as beacon request. If we receive the correct response to our stimulus, we assume that our crafted
frame was received.

Franconian Notch
According to the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, a preamble
field should contain 32 binary zeros—8 zero (0x0) symbols.
However, some chipsets may accept non-standard preambles. For example, the CC2420 can be programmed to ignore
some of the least significant symbols in the synchronization
header to help it be more resilient to noise [38]. Figure 3
shows the physical frame crafted for the Franconian Notch2
method. Here we modulate each subsequent symbol of the
standard preamble from 0x0 to 0xF3 , going from all zeros
(0x0s) to all 0xFs. The aim of this technique is to measure
the number of invalid preamble symbols a radio is willing to
accept. Note, again, that the only portion of the frame that
is modified from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is the preamble
symbols. If a radio and its firmware are fully standards compliant, any variation should result in an abandoned packet
and no response.

Crafting Physical Frame Headers. Before introducing
the designed methods, it should be noted that many commodity radios cannot craft arbitrary physical frame headers,
SHR and PHR. By design, the radio hardware manages the
frame headers to assure proper functionality. In order to
fully control a physical frame’s contents, we make use of our

2
The Franconian Notch is a mountain pass through the
White Mountains of New Hampshire.
3
It should be noted that we do not attempt to modulate the
possible combinations of 0x0s and 0x1s.

1
Some radios deviate from the standard and allow the SFD
to be set via an internal register.

3

To test the functionality of our proposed fingerprinting methods, we built a testbed to examine how different IEEE 802.15.4
stacks respond to the types of non-standard physical headers
previously described.

Figure 3: Physical frame with Franconian Notch. The number of zero (0x0) symbols that compose the preamble is varied between 0 and 8, with the lengths remainder transformed
into 0xF symbols. Any response to a non-standard preamble
might signify a fingerprint.

4.1

Testbed Layout

Our testbed consists of only commodity hardware and opensource software. As shown in Figure 6, two 802.15.4 radios
are connected (via serial over USB) to a single workstation
running Isotope, our fingerprinting software. Isotope is a
Python framework that utilizes the open source libraries
Scapy [10], to build IEEE 802.15.4 physical frames, and
KillerBee [6], to configure the radios, monitorq communications traffic, and inject arbitrary frames. One radio is
used solely to transmit crafted frames and the other radio
is used to sniff all traffic on a particular channel. The third,
unknown, device is setup to listen to a specific channel and
respond to beacon requests.

Franconian Bridge
Inspired by the previous approaches, the Franconian Bridge
method “spans the gap” between the variable preamble length
and Franconian Notch techniques. As shown in Figure 4,
the Franconian Bridge checks to see how a target responds
to having a varying number of 0xF symbols placed between
the fully-standard preamble and the SFD. Technically, this
will evaluate a radios behavior in the presence of a seemingly non-standard SFD. As before, the only portion of the
frame that is modified from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is
that following the preamble and preceding a SFD. If a radio
and its firmware are fully standards compliant, any variation
should result in an abandoned packet and no response.

Figure 4: Physical frame with Franconian Bridge. A
varying number of 0xF symbols are inserted between a
fully-standard preamble and SFD. Any response to a nonstandard SFD might signify a fingerprint.

Cumberland Gap

Figure 6: Fingerprinting testbed. Our Python framework,
Isotope, manages separate transmitting and receiving radios and monitors communications. All radios operate on
the same channel, with the transmitter sending out nonstandard beacon requests. The unknown device is configured to listen for valid requests and respond. The receiving
radio listens for beacon responses.

The Cumberland Gap4 technique, as seen in Figure 5, measures how a target behaves with respect to receiving frames
immediately after receiving a valid preamble and an invalid
SFD, followed by a standard frame.

Figure 5: Physical frame with Cumberland Gap. An invalid
SFD is injected, followed by a varying amount of garbage
symbols. Any unique response might signify a fingerprint.

Although this setup may appear contrived—802.15.4 devices
may be configured to hop between various channels, as they
send and receive frames, for additional robustness or to frustrate reverse engineering—we believe that our setup is a
good starting point and that it can be extended to work
with a variety of target configurations.

It is important to remember that when radios are listening for data, they read whatever they find into a symbol.
Therefore, it is quite common for a radio to be prepared to
accept a frame when it is merely listening to interference
and reading them into symbols. There are a few discrete
states that a radio state machine has to go through when
finding an SFD. In this method, we intentionally make the
SFD very close to the standard to nudge the receiver as close
as possible to the state where it receives a full frame without
outright telling it to take the remainder of the frame. When
the incorrect SFD arrives, the chip goes back to listening for
a preamble—we seek to measure the timing of this behavior.
The fewer symbols that we can inject and still get a response
may imply a faster turn-over time, and might also signify a
fingerprint.

4.2

5.
4.

Hardware and Software

We tested multiple devices5 including Zigduinos [33], RZUSBsticks [17], and the popular (but now discontinued)Tmote
Sky [34]. Each of these devices contain different on-board
radio chips, namely an Atmel ATmega128RFA1 [16], an
Atmel AT86RF230 [15], and a Chipcon CC2420 [38], respectively. Finally, each device has several associated opensource firmware distributions including Arduino [14], Chibi [25,
26], Contiki OS [20], GoodFET [2], and Tiny OS [39]. Table 1 summarizes the different possible combinations.

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

RESULTS

To-date, only the GoodFET firmware combinations have
yielded results. The following charts represent the individual

4

The Cumberland Gap is a mountain pass through the
Appalachian Mountains between Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Virginia.

5
We did not test the Freakduino, and only recently received
the Api-Mote to replace the Tmote Sky.
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Radio

zigduino

atmega128rfa1

freakduino
at86rf230
rzusbstick
apimote
cc2420

tmote sky

Firmware
Arduino
Contiki
GoodFET
TinyOS
Arduino
Chibi
GoodFET
Chibi
Contiki
Raven
GoodFET
Contiki
GoodFET
TinyOS

tmote

zigduino

rzusbstick

6
Number of inserted symbols

Device

5
4
3
2
1
0

Table 1: Hardware and Firmware Combinations
0
tmote

zigduino

400

600

800

1,000

Number of beacons received

7
Number of inserted symbols

200

rzusbstick

Figure 8: Franconian Notch with GoodFET firmware.

6
zero 0xF symbols present. It appears as though the Tmote,
previously loose with the standard, is now fully compliant.
Since the Tmote previously accepted fewer preamble symbols, this could be an artifact of the radio interpreting the
additional 0xF symbols as an invalid SFD, or it could have
to do with the RF demodulator’s sync circuit being thrown
out of state by the additional bit transitions. Again, the
RZUSBstick responds to far fewer beacon requests. This
may be explained by the position of the mote during testing
or the fact that both the Tmote and Zigduinos use external
antennas. In either case, the RZUSBstick stands out by accepting as many as 4 0xF symbols within the preamble. For
both the Tmote and RZUSBstick, this looks like a possible
identifier.

5
4
3
2
1
0
0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Number of beacons received
Figure 7: Variable preamble with GoodFET firmware.

Franconian Bridge
The results for the Franconian Bridge method are shown
in Figure 9. Recall that this technique inserts garbage between a valid preamble and a valid SFD. Ideally, a radio
would interpret the garbage as an invalid SFD. As in the
previous method’s results, the Tmote strictly adheres to the
standard; while, the RZUSBstick drastically increases its
responses from the previous two tests. The RZUSBstick
accepts, with high likelihood, up to 5 garbage symbols interposed between the preamble and SFD.

beacon responses received, out of 1000 non-standard beacon
requests, for each radio device with GoodFET firmware.

Variable Preamble Length
Figure 7 shows the results of varying the number of preamble
symbols from 0 to 7 —8 zero (0x0) symbols is the standard.
Clearly, the Tmote device responds to the fewest number
of preamble symbols. It is possible that this is by design.
Remember, the Tmote contains a CC2420 radio chip which
allows a programmable number of preamble bits to be accepted. Assuming normal function, it seems obvious that
the Tmote is distinguishable from the Zigduino and RZUSBstick. Somewhat unsettling is that the RZUSBstick responds
to less than 200 beacon requests with 6 or 7 symbols. It is
possible that this device is more strictly-standards compliant; a test run with 8 symbols might verify this assumption.

Cumberland Gap
The results for the Cumberland Gap method, seen in Figure 10, do not seem encouraging. None of the motes respond
to more than about 600 beacon requests. There may have
been some interference or channel noise during this test run.
It should be run again. It appears as though the Tmote has
the fastest turnaround time, while the RZUSBstick maintains the slowest.

Franconian Notch

6.

Figure 8 showcases the results of transforming the preamble
from 8 zero (0x0) symbols to 6 0xF symbols. Zero (0) on
the Y-axis represents a fully standard physical frame, with

With the number of wireless sensor networks exploding, a
large portion being IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee devices, it is
essential that we be able to secure and protect these devices
5

CONCLUSIONS

tmote

zigduino

and networks for mission-critical systems. Fingerprinting
these radio devices is a first step along the path to achieving
that security. Device identification, both passive and active,
has been used on many other wireless network protocols.
Our work seeks to apply it to IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radio devices. By accurately identifying different devices, we
have another tool on-top of PKI authentication schemes for
verifying trusted nodes in a network. Similarly, by analyzing how frames and packets make their way through the
firmware and radio circuitry, it is possible that we may uncover hidden vulnerabilities and attack vectors.

rzusbstick

Number of inserted symbols

6
5
4

With only preliminary results, it appears that the Tmote
devices, with the Chipcon CC2420 radio chipset, and the
RZUSBsticks, with the Atmel AT86RF230 radio chipset, are
identifiable. A summary of our results to-date is shown in
Table 2. The Tmotes clearly respond to very non-standard
preamble lengths, whether by design or flaw; however, the
same devices seem to be very strict on preamble and SFD
content. Meanwhile, the RZUSBsticks present a conundrum. In three of the tests, the devices respond with an
alarmingly low rate. It is possible the devices are very slow,
are receiving too much noise, or simply do not receive all the
beacon requests without external radios. From the results
that we do have, it looks like the RZUSBsticks accept very
non-standard preamble and SFD content. The CC2420 chips
look like the top contender so far to avoid WIDS detection.
Further work would need to confirm this.

3
2
1
0
0
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800

1,000

Number of beacons received
Figure 9: Franconian Bridge with GoodFET firmware.

ATmega128RFA1

AT86RF230
CC2420

tmote

zigduino

Preamble
—
H
—
H
—
—
I
—
H
H

Franconia Notch
—
H
—
H
—
—
I
—
L
L

Franconia Bridge
—
H
—
H
—
—
I
—
L
L

Cumberland Gap
—
H
—
H
—
—
I
—
L
L

Table 2: Summary of results to date. The following table
is labelled based on our current confidence in identifiability.
An ‘H’ means that for a specific radio/firmware combination, the given fingerprinting technique is likely to be distinguishable from other radio/firmware combinations. An
‘L’ means that, at this time, little evidence suggests a specific radio/firmware combination is easily identifiable. An
‘I’ means inconclusive at this time. An ‘—’ means that we
have yet to test this radio/firmware combination.

rzusbstick

9
Number of inserted symbols

Firmware
Contiki
Goodfet
TinyOS
Zigduino
Chibi
Contiki
Raven
Contiki
Goodfet
TinyOS

8
7
6
5

6.1

4
3
2
1
0
0

200

400

600

800

Future Work

We feel this work is ripe for research. As shown above,
there are many more possible firmware and hardware combinations to test. We have really only just begun. Moving
forward, it will be necessary to evaluate the effect of noise
and interference on the testbed. Of course, our software
framework, Isotope, will also require some additional refinements to make it more robust. Typically, in device identification, a database of fingerprints is used in combination
with some sort of machine learning method to analyze and
evaluate fingerprint matches. Our current work constitutes
only the first stage of identifying possible fingerprints. We
should also consider additional techniques for fingerprinting,
such as length overflow. Lastly, we would like to explore the
potential for WIDS evasion by these commodity radios.

1,000

Number of beacons received
Figure 10: Cumberland Gap with GoodFET firmware.
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